Setup what the Air Force did in Vietnam and why

American military professionals, especially the US Air Force, have had a difficult time understanding their role in this nation's defeat in Vietnam. Dr Tilford provides a critical self-analysis and questions the underlying assumptions of the Air Force's strategy in Southeast Asia. He argue...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Tilford, Earl H. (-)
Formato: Libro electrónico
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. : Washington, DC : Air University Press ; For sale by the Supt. of Docs., US G.P.O 1991.
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Descripción
Sumario:American military professionals, especially the US Air Force, have had a difficult time understanding their role in this nation's defeat in Vietnam. Dr Tilford provides a critical self-analysis and questions the underlying assumptions of the Air Force's strategy in Southeast Asia. He argues that we must understand what went wrong in Vietnam and why and not manipulate the record and paint failure as victory. He explains what led to the "setup," which not only resulted in a failure for airpower but also contributed to the fall of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to Communist forces in 1975.
Descripción Física:1 online resource (xx, 308 pages) : illustrations
Formato:Para acceso remoto utilizar usuario y contraseña del campus virtual UPSA
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
Bibliografía:Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN:9781429458276
Acceso:El acceso desde las instalaciones de la UPSA es libre.