A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation
Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements.
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| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Oxford :
Oxford University Press
2007.
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| Colección: | Lipsey Lectures series.
Oxford scholarship online open access. |
| Acceso en línea: | Conectar con la versión electrónica |
| Ver en Universidad de Navarra: | https://innopac.unav.es/record=b46206024*spi |
| Sumario: | Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements. |
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| Descripción Física: | 1 recurso electrónico (xiv, 321 páginas) : ilustraciones |
| Formato: | Forma de acceso: World Wide Web. |
| Bibliografía: | Incluye referencias bibliográficas e índice. |
| ISBN: | 9780191709104 |
