Moral disagreement
Folke Tersman explores what we can learn about the nature of moral thinking by examining moral disagreement. He explains how diversity of opinion on moral issues undermines the idea that moral convictions can be objectively valued. Arguments on moral thinking are often criticized for not being able...
| Otros Autores: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press
2006.
|
| Colección: | CUP ebooks.
Cambridge studies in philosophy. |
| Acceso en línea: | Conectar con la versión electrónica |
| Ver en Universidad de Navarra: | https://innopac.unav.es/record=b42012922*spi |
| Sumario: | Folke Tersman explores what we can learn about the nature of moral thinking by examining moral disagreement. He explains how diversity of opinion on moral issues undermines the idea that moral convictions can be objectively valued. Arguments on moral thinking are often criticized for not being able to explain why there is a contrast between ethics and other areas in which there is disagreement, but where one does not give up the idea of an objective truth, as in the natural sciences. Tersman shows that the contrast has to do with facts about when, and on what basis, moral convictions can be correctly attributed to an agent or speaker. |
|---|---|
| Notas: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). |
| Descripción Física: | 1 recurso electrónico (xvii, 141 p.) |
| Formato: | Forma de acceso: World Wide Web. |
| ISBN: | 9780511570599 |
