Emotional reason deliberation, motivation, and the nature of value
How can we motivate ourselves to do what we think we ought? How can we deliberate about personal values and priorities? Bennett Helm argues that standard philosophical answers to these questions presuppose a sharp distinction between cognition and conation that undermines an adequate understanding o...
| Otros Autores: | |
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| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press
2001.
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| Colección: | CUP ebooks.
Cambridge studies in philosophy. |
| Acceso en línea: | Conectar con la versión electrónica |
| Ver en Universidad de Navarra: | https://innopac.unav.es/record=b42011772*spi |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- 1. Two problems of practical reason
- pt. I. Felt Evaluations. 2. Emotions and the cognitive-conative divide. 3. Constituting import. 4. Varieties of import: cares, values, and preferences
- pt. II. Practical Reason. 5. Single evaluative perspective. 6. Rational control: freedom of the will and the heart. 7. Deliberation about value. 8. Persons, friendship, and moral value.
