Emotional reason deliberation, motivation, and the nature of value
How can we motivate ourselves to do what we think we ought? How can we deliberate about personal values and priorities? Bennett Helm argues that standard philosophical answers to these questions presuppose a sharp distinction between cognition and conation that undermines an adequate understanding o...
| Otros Autores: | |
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| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press
2001.
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| Colección: | CUP ebooks.
Cambridge studies in philosophy. |
| Acceso en línea: | Conectar con la versión electrónica |
| Ver en Universidad de Navarra: | https://innopac.unav.es/record=b42011772*spi |
| Sumario: | How can we motivate ourselves to do what we think we ought? How can we deliberate about personal values and priorities? Bennett Helm argues that standard philosophical answers to these questions presuppose a sharp distinction between cognition and conation that undermines an adequate understanding of values and their connection to motivation and deliberation. Rejecting this distinction, Helm argues that emotions are fundamental to any account of value and motivation, and he develops a detailed alternative theory both of emotions, desires and evaluative judgements and of their rational interconnections. The result is an innovative theory of practical rationality and of how we can control not only what we do but also what we value and who we are as persons. |
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| Notas: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). |
| Descripción Física: | 1 recurso electrónico (x, 261 p.) |
| Formato: | Forma de acceso: World Wide Web. |
| ISBN: | 9780511520044 |
