The principle of sufficient reason a reassessment

The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) says that all contingent facts must have explanation. In this 2006 volume, which was the first on the topic in the English language in nearly half a century, Alexander Pruss examines the substantive philosophical issues raised by the Principle Reason. Discuss...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Otros Autores: Pruss, Alexander R., autor (autor)
Formato: Libro electrónico
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press 2006.
Colección:CUP ebooks.
Cambridge studies in philosophy.
Acceso en línea:Conectar con la versión electrónica
Ver en Universidad de Navarra:https://innopac.unav.es/record=b42011553*spi
Descripción
Sumario:The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) says that all contingent facts must have explanation. In this 2006 volume, which was the first on the topic in the English language in nearly half a century, Alexander Pruss examines the substantive philosophical issues raised by the Principle Reason. Discussing various forms of the PSR and selected historical episodes, from Parmenides, Leibnez, and Hume, Pruss defends the claim that every true contingent proposition must have an explanation against major objections, including Hume's imaginability argument and Peter van Inwagen's argument that the PSR entails modal fatalism. Pruss also provides a number of positive arguments for the PSR, based on considerations as different as the metaphysics of existence, counterfactuals and modality, negative explanations, and the everyday applicability of the PSR. Moreover, Pruss shows how the PSR would advance the discussion in a number of disparate fields, including meta-ethics and the philosophy of mathematics.
Notas:Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
Descripción Física:1 recurso electrónico (xiii, 335 p.)
Formato:Forma de acceso: World Wide Web.
ISBN:9780511498992