On action

This book deals with foundational issues in the theory of the nature of action, the intentionality of action, the compatibility of freedom of action with determinism, and the explantion of action. Ginet's is a volitional view: that every action has as its core a 'simple' mental action...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Otros Autores: Ginet, Carl, autor (autor)
Formato: Libro electrónico
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press 1990.
Colección:CUP ebooks.
Cambridge studies in philosophy.
Acceso en línea:Conectar con la versión electrónica
Ver en Universidad de Navarra:https://innopac.unav.es/record=b42004299*spi
Descripción
Sumario:This book deals with foundational issues in the theory of the nature of action, the intentionality of action, the compatibility of freedom of action with determinism, and the explantion of action. Ginet's is a volitional view: that every action has as its core a 'simple' mental action. He develops a sophisticated account of the individuation of actions and also propounds a challenging version of the view that freedom of action is incompatible with determinism.
Notas:Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
Descripción Física:1 recurso electrónico (xi, 159 p.)
Formato:Forma de acceso: World Wide Web.
ISBN:9781139173780