Representations, targets, and attitude

What is it for something in the mind to represent something? Robert Cummins looks at the familiar problems of representation theory (what information is represented in the mind, what form mental representation takes, how representational schemes are implemented in the brain, what it is for one thing...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Cummins, Robert, 1944- (-)
Formato: Libro electrónico
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press cop. 1996.
Colección:EBSCO Academic eBook Collection Complete.
Representation and mind.
Acceso en línea:Conectar con la versión electrónica
Ver en Universidad de Navarra:https://innopac.unav.es/record=b4119505x*spi
Descripción
Sumario:What is it for something in the mind to represent something? Robert Cummins looks at the familiar problems of representation theory (what information is represented in the mind, what form mental representation takes, how representational schemes are implemented in the brain, what it is for one thing to represent another) from an unprecedented angle. Instead of following the usual procedure of defending a version of "indicator" semantics, Cummins begins with a theory of representational error and uses this theory to constrain the account of representational content. Thus, the problem of misrepresentation, which plagues all other accounts, is avoided at the start. Cummins shows that representational error can be accommodated only if the content of a representation is intrinsic - independent of its use and causal role in the system that employs it.
Cummins's theory of error is based on the teleological idea of a "target," an intentional concept but one that differs importantly from that of an ordinary intentional object. Using this notion he offers a schematic theory of representation and an account of propositional attitudes that takes exception with some popular positions, such as conceptual role semantics, Fodor's representational theory of the mind, and Putnam's twin-earth examples.
Notas:"A Bradford book."
Descripción Física:153 p. : il
Formato:Forma de acceso: World Wide Web.
Bibliografía:Incluye referencias bibliográficas (p. 147-149) e índice.
ISBN:9780262271035
9780585031071
9780262032353