Judges beyond politics in democracy and dictatorship lessons from Chile
"Why did Chilean judges, trained under and appointed by democratic governments, facilitate and condone the liberal, antidemocratic, and antilegal policies of the Pinochet regime? Challenging the common assumption that adjudication in nondemocratic settings is fundamentally different and less pu...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
New York :
Cambridge University Press
2007.
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| Colección: | CUP ebooks.
Cambridge studies in law and society. |
| Acceso en línea: | Conectar con la versión electrónica |
| Ver en Universidad de Navarra: | https://innopac.unav.es/record=b40156242*spi |
| Sumario: | "Why did Chilean judges, trained under and appointed by democratic governments, facilitate and condone the liberal, antidemocratic, and antilegal policies of the Pinochet regime? Challenging the common assumption that adjudication in nondemocratic settings is fundamentally different and less puzzling than it is in democratic regimes, this book offers a longitudinal analysis of judicial behavior, demonstrating striking continuity in judicial performance across regimes in Chile. The work explores the relevance of judges' personal policy preferences, social class, and legal philosophy but argues that institutional factors best account for the persistent failure of judges to take stands in defense of rights and rule of law principles. Specifically, the institutional structure and ideology of the Chilean judiciary, grounded in the ideal of judicial apoliticism, furnished judges with professional understandings and incentives that left them unequipped and disinclined to take stands in defense of liberal democratic principles before, during, and after the authoritarian interlude."--Jacket. |
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| Descripción Física: | 1 recurso electrónico |
| Formato: | Forma de acceso: World Wide Web. |
| Bibliografía: | Incluye referencias bibliográficas (p. 261-285) e índice. |
| ISBN: | 9780511511509 |
