Value and justification the foundations of liberal theory

"This important new book takes as its points of departure two questions: what is the nature of valuing; and what morality can be justified in a society that deeply disagrees on what is truly valuable? In Part One, the author develops a theory of value that attempts to reconcile reason with pass...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Gaus, Gerald F. (-)
Formato: Libro electrónico
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Cambridge [England] ; New York : Cambridge University Press 1990.
Colección:CUP ebooks.
Cambridge studies in philosophy.
Acceso en línea:Conectar con la versión electrónica
Ver en Universidad de Navarra:https://innopac.unav.es/record=b39723094*spi
Descripción
Sumario:"This important new book takes as its points of departure two questions: what is the nature of valuing; and what morality can be justified in a society that deeply disagrees on what is truly valuable? In Part One, the author develops a theory of value that attempts to reconcile reason with passions. Part Two explores how this theory of value grounds our commitment to moral action. The author argues that rational moral action can neither be seen as a way simply of maximizing one's own values, nor derived from reason independent of one's values. Rather, our commitment to the moral point of view is presupposed by our value systems. The book concludes with a defense of liberal political morality." "This book will be read with profit by philosophers, political theorists, and psychologists. Book jacket."--Jacket.
Descripción Física:1 recurso electrónico
Formato:Forma de acceso: World Wide Web.
Bibliografía:Incluye referencias bibliográficas (p. 490-515) e índice.
ISBN:9780511625046