Strategic foundations of general equilibrium dynamic matching and bargaining games
"This book, written by contemporary economic theorists, reports on a major research program to provide strategic foundations for the theory of perfect competition."
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge ; New York :
Cambridge University Press
2000.
|
| Colección: | CUP ebooks.
Churchill lectures in economic theory. |
| Acceso en línea: | Conectar con la versión electrónica |
| Ver en Universidad de Navarra: | https://innopac.unav.es/record=b39684982*spi |
| Sumario: | "This book, written by contemporary economic theorists, reports on a major research program to provide strategic foundations for the theory of perfect competition." "Beginning with a concise survey of how the theory of competition has evolved, Gale makes extensive and rigorous use of dynamic matching and bargaining models to provide a more complete description of how a competitive equilibrium is achieved. Whereas economists have made use of a macroscopic description of markets in which certain behavioral characteristics, such as price-talking behavior, are taken for granted, Gale uses games theory to re-evaluate this assumption, beginning with individual agents and modelling their strategic interaction. A strategic foundation for competitive equilibrium shows how such interaction leads to competitive, price-talking behavior." "This book is essential reading for graduate courses in game theory and general equilibrium."--Jacket. |
|---|---|
| Descripción Física: | 1 recurso electrónico |
| Formato: | Forma de acceso: World Wide Web. |
| Bibliografía: | Incluye referencias bibliográficas (p. 208-213) e índice. |
| ISBN: | 9780511011160 9780511117442 9780511492310 9780511051883 9780511152245 9781280153761 |
