Equity Financing and Covenants in Venture Capital An Augmented Contracting Approach to Optimal German Contract Design

Venture capital contracts define the rules of the investment for the venture capitalist and the portfolio company. They therefore have the potential to impact the success of the business and the venture capitalist's return. For this reason, contracts have recently attracted great research inter...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Jung-Senssfelder, Karoline (-)
Autor Corporativo: SpringerLink (-)
Formato: Libro electrónico
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Wiesbaden : DUV 2006.
Colección:Springer eBooks.
Acceso en línea:Conectar con la versión electrónica
Ver en Universidad de Navarra:https://innopac.unav.es/record=b37582008*spi
Descripción
Sumario:Venture capital contracts define the rules of the investment for the venture capitalist and the portfolio company. They therefore have the potential to impact the success of the business and the venture capitalist's return. For this reason, contracts have recently attracted great research interest. Karoline Jung-Senssfelder presents the first augmented contracting analysis, focusing on the interaction of both, financial instruments and covenants, in the creation of incentives to the contracting parties. With a focus on the German market, she integrates the findings of her model-based theoretical and survey-based empirical analyses to derive value-adding implications for an incentive-compatible contract design in the German venture capital market.
Descripción Física:XXIV, 283 p.
Formato:Forma de acceso: World Wide Web.
ISBN:9783835091887