Learning from experience Volume II, Lessons from the U.S. Navy's Ohio, Seawolf, and Virginia submarine programs Volume II, Lessons from the U.S. Navy's Ohio, Seawolf, and Virginia submarine programs
Large, complex submarine design and construction programs demand personnel with unique skills and capabilities supplemented with practical experiences in their areas of expertise. Recognizing the importance of past experiences for successful program management, the U.S. Navy asked the RAND Corporati...
| Autores Corporativos: | , , |
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| Otros Autores: | , , , , , , |
| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Santa Monica, California :
RAND
2011.
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| Colección: | JSTOR Open Access monographs.
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| Acceso en línea: | Conectar con la versión electrónica |
| Ver en Universidad de Navarra: | https://innopac.unav.es/record=b35779111*spi |
| Sumario: | Large, complex submarine design and construction programs demand personnel with unique skills and capabilities supplemented with practical experiences in their areas of expertise. Recognizing the importance of past experiences for successful program management, the U.S. Navy asked the RAND Corporation to develop a set of lessons learned from previous submarine programs that could help inform future program managers. This volume presents lessons from three submarine programs. The RAND team looked at how the programs were managed, the issues that affected management decisions, and the outcomes of those decisions. All three submarine programs had tenuous beginnings. Each experienced cost overruns and schedule delays in the construction of its first-of-class submarine. The Ohio and Virginia programs made corrections, and both are viewed as generally successful. Seawolf, probably due to the changing threat and budgetary environment, was terminated before changes could be made to correct early missteps. An overarching lesson from the three programs is the importance of program stability. Stability applies in many areas--funding consistency, a long-term build strategy, fixed operational requirements, program management, and an integrated partnership between the Navy and the shipbuilders. |
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| Notas: | "RAND National Defense Research Institute." "This research was conducted within the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute"--Pg. IV. |
| Descripción Física: | 1 recurso electrónico (xxxi, 121 p.) : il |
| Formato: | Forma de acceso: World Wide Web. |
| Bibliografía: | Incluye referencias bibliográficas (p. 117-121). |
| ISBN: | 9780833058966 9780833059031 9780833077561 |
