| Sumario: | Kant{u2019}s injunction that we must treat persons as ends in themselves and never merely as means is plausible but often misunderstood. This book shows how the notions of treating persons as ends in themselves and, by contrast, merely as means, can be anchored outside Kant and clarified in ways that enhance their usefulness in ethical theory and in practical ethics, where they are often felt to have considerable intuitive force. Constructing an account of treatment of persons{u2014}of what treatment is, how it differs from mere interpersonal action, and what ethical standards govern it{u2014} the book considers not just behavior toward persons but also its motivation and the phenomenology of purposive action. Treatment of persons is conceived as conduct: a three-dimensional behavioral complex whose central elements are the salient act-type, say rescuing, the agent{u2019}s motivation for it, and the manner of its performance. The book clarifies these elements of conduct and shows how the triple-barreled notion of treatment of persons{u2014}whether merely as means or as ends in themselves{u2014}is ethically important. Given this wide-ranging account of treatment, it shows much about the scope of moral judgment and the dimensions of moral responsibility. These results contribute mainly to ethical theory. The book also contributes to normative ethics, particularly through examining diverse narrative examples of moral and immoral conduct. The partial ethics of conduct it introduces clarifies both the scope of moral responsibility and the normative standards for living up to it.
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