Deciding to leave the politics of retirement from the United States Supreme Court
While much has been written on Supreme Court appointments, Deciding to Leave provides the first systematic look at the process by which justices decide to retire from the bench, and why this has become increasingly partisan in recent years. Since 1954, generous retirement provisions and decreasing w...
Autor principal: | |
---|---|
Formato: | Libro electrónico |
Idioma: | Inglés |
Publicado: |
Albany :
State University of New York Press
2003.
|
Colección: | EBSCO Academic eBook Collection Complete.
SUNY series in American constitutionalism. |
Acceso en línea: | Conectar con la versión electrónica |
Ver en Universidad de Navarra: | https://innopac.unav.es/record=b3192492x*spi |
Sumario: | While much has been written on Supreme Court appointments, Deciding to Leave provides the first systematic look at the process by which justices decide to retire from the bench, and why this has become increasingly partisan in recent years. Since 1954, generous retirement provisions and decreasing workloads have allowed justices to depart strategically when a president of their own party occupies the White House. Otherwise, the justices remain in their seats, often past their ability to effectively participate in the work of the Court. While there are benefits and drawbacks to various reform proposals, Ward argues that mandatory retirement goes farthest in combating partisanship and protecting the institution of the Court. |
---|---|
Descripción Física: | xiii, 344 p. : il |
Formato: | Forma de acceso: World Wide Web. |
Bibliografía: | Incluye referencias bibliográficas (p. 313-328) e índice. |
ISBN: | 9781417523979 9780791456521 9780791456514 9780791487228 |