The democratic constitution
In this fascinating debunking of judicial supremacy, Devins and Fisher argue that nonjudicial contributions to constitutional interpretation make the Constitution more stable, more consistent with constitutional principles, and more protective of individual and minority rights. This highly readable...
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| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
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Oxford ; New York :
Oxford University Press
2004.
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| Colección: | EBSCO Academic eBook Collection Complete.
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| Acceso en línea: | Conectar con la versión electrónica |
| Ver en Universidad de Navarra: | https://innopac.unav.es/record=b3185624x*spi |
| Sumario: | In this fascinating debunking of judicial supremacy, Devins and Fisher argue that nonjudicial contributions to constitutional interpretation make the Constitution more stable, more consistent with constitutional principles, and more protective of individual and minority rights. This highly readable narrative of how the Court and elected officials work in concert with the American people to shape constitutional values is an impressive affirmation of public participation in the political process. |
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| Descripción Física: | ix, 303 p. |
| Formato: | Forma de acceso: World Wide Web. |
| Bibliografía: | Incluye referencias bibliográficas (p. 241-287) e índice. |
| ISBN: | 9781423720669 9781280427831 |
