Wittgenstein on the arbitrariness of grammar

What is the nature of a conceptual scheme? Are there alternative conceptual schemes? If so, are some more justifiable or correct than others? The later Wittgenstein already addresses these fundamental philosophical questions under the general rubric of "grammar" and the question of its &qu...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Forster, Michael N. (-)
Formato: Libro electrónico
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press c2004.
Colección:EBSCO Academic eBook Collection Complete.
Acceso en línea:Conectar con la versión electrónica
Ver en Universidad de Navarra:https://innopac.unav.es/record=b31433091*spi
Descripción
Sumario:What is the nature of a conceptual scheme? Are there alternative conceptual schemes? If so, are some more justifiable or correct than others? The later Wittgenstein already addresses these fundamental philosophical questions under the general rubric of "grammar" and the question of its "arbitrariness"--And does so with great subtlety. This book explores Wittgenstein's views on these questions. Part I interprets his conception of grammar as a generalized (and otherwise modified) version of Kant's transcendental idealist solution to a puzzle about necessity. It also seeks to reconcile Wittgenste.
Descripción Física:xiii, 247 p.
Formato:Forma de acceso: World Wide Web.
Bibliografía:Incluye referencias bibliográficas ([193]-239) e índice.
ISBN:9781400826049
9780691113661