Measuring judicial independence the political economy of judging in Japan
The role of the U.S. Supreme Court in the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election raised questions in the minds of many Americans about the relationships between judges and political influence; the following years saw equally heated debates over the appropriate role of political ideology in sele...
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Otros Autores: | |
| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Chicago :
University of Chicago Press
2003.
|
| Colección: | EBSCO Academic eBook Collection Complete.
Studies in law and economics. |
| Acceso en línea: | Conectar con la versión electrónica |
| Ver en Universidad de Navarra: | https://innopac.unav.es/record=b31347411*spi |
| Sumario: | The role of the U.S. Supreme Court in the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election raised questions in the minds of many Americans about the relationships between judges and political influence; the following years saw equally heated debates over the appropriate role of political ideology in selecting federal judges. Legal scholars have always debated these questions--asking, in effect, how much judicial systems operate on merit and principle and how much they are shaped by politics. The Japanese Constitution, like many others, requires that all judges be "independent in the exercise of. |
|---|---|
| Descripción Física: | xii, 201 p. : il |
| Formato: | Forma de acceso: World Wide Web. |
| Bibliografía: | Incluye referencias bibliográficas (p. 187-196) e índice. |
| ISBN: | 9780226703879 |
