Accountability arrangements for financial sector regulators
Policymakers are often reluctant to grant independence to the agencies that regulate and supervise the financial sector because of the fear that these agencies, with their wide-ranging responsibilities and powers, could become a law unto themselves. This pamphlet describes mechanisms for making regu...
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| Otros Autores: | , |
| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
[Washington, D.C.] :
International Monetary Fund
c2006.
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| Colección: | EBSCO Academic eBook Collection Complete.
Economic issues ; 39. |
| Acceso en línea: | Conectar con la versión electrónica |
| Ver en Universidad de Navarra: | https://innopac.unav.es/record=b31011755*spi |
| Sumario: | Policymakers are often reluctant to grant independence to the agencies that regulate and supervise the financial sector because of the fear that these agencies, with their wide-ranging responsibilities and powers, could become a law unto themselves. This pamphlet describes mechanisms for making regulatory agencies accountable not only to the government but also to the industry they supervise and the public at large, with examples from a range of countries. |
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| Notas: | "This pamphlet, prepared by David Cheney, is a companion piece to Economic Issue No. 32, "Should Financial Sector Regulators Be Independent?" which is available on the IMF's website. It is based on IMF Working Paper 05/51, "The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors: Principles and Practice," by Eva Hüpkes, Marc Quintyn, and Michael W. Taylor"--Pref. |
| Descripción Física: | 23 p. |
| Formato: | Forma de acceso: World Wide Web. |
| ISBN: | 9781451935639 |
