Believing against the evidence agency and the ethics of belief
The question of whether it is ever permissible to believe on insufficient evidence has once again become a live question. Greater attention is now being paid to practical dimensions of belief, namely issues related to epistemic virtue, doxastic responsibility, and voluntarism. In this book, McCormic...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Formato: | Libro |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
New York ; and London :
Routledge
2014
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| Edición: | 1st publ |
| Colección: | Routledge studies in contemporary philosophy ;
63 |
| Materias: | |
| Ver en Universidad de Navarra: | https://innopac.unav.es/record=b29491794*spi |
| Sumario: | The question of whether it is ever permissible to believe on insufficient evidence has once again become a live question. Greater attention is now being paid to practical dimensions of belief, namely issues related to epistemic virtue, doxastic responsibility, and voluntarism. In this book, McCormick argues that the standards used to evaluate beliefs are not isolated from other evaluative domains. The ultimate criteria for assessing beliefs are the same as those for assessing action because beliefs and actions are both products of agency. Two important implications of this thesis, both of which deviate from the dominant view in contemporary philosophy, are 1) it can be permissible (and possible) to believe for non-evidential reasons, and 2) we have a robust control over many of our beliefs, a control sufficient to ground attributions of responsibility for belief |
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| Descripción Física: | xiv, 144 p. ; 24 cm |
| Bibliografía: | Incluye referencias bibliográficas |
| ISBN: | 9780415818841 9780203579145 |
