| Sumario: | The author of this chapter discusses the psychological concept of free will and attempts to answer the following questions: First, what are the psychological roots of our concept of free will? Second, how might progress on the first question contribute to progress regarding normative debates about the proper concept of free will? In sections 2 and 3 I address the first question. Section 2 discusses recent work in the experimental philosophy of free will and motivates the study I report in section 3. Section 4 reflects on the second question in light of the reported results.To preview, the results suggest that the psychological structure of our concept of free will is sensitive to three independent features: Liberty, Ensurance, and Consciousness. I argue this supports the view that our concept is incompatibilist more than the view that our concept is compatibilist, and I discuss two proposals regarding the normative upshot. On one proposal, these results might be taken to offer some support to incompatibilism about the proper concept. A second proposal, however, makes room for a much different upshot.
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