Dynamic models of oligopoly
Fudenberg and Tirole use the game-theoretic issues of information, commitment and timing to provide a realistic approach to oligopoly.
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| Otros Autores: | |
| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon [England] :
Routledge
2001.
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| Edición: | 1st edition |
| Colección: | Industrial economics ;
v. 1. |
| Materias: | |
| Ver en Biblioteca Universitat Ramon Llull: | https://discovery.url.edu/permalink/34CSUC_URL/1im36ta/alma991009628713906719 |
| Sumario: | Fudenberg and Tirole use the game-theoretic issues of information, commitment and timing to provide a realistic approach to oligopoly. |
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| Notas: | Reprint: first published in 1986 by Harwood Academic Publishers. |
| Descripción Física: | 1 online resource (95 p.) |
| Bibliografía: | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| ISBN: | 9781136456121 9780415771238 9781136456053 9781315014623 |
