A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation
Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements.
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| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Oxford :
Oxford University Press
2007.
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| Colección: | Lipsey lectures.
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| Ver en Biblioteca Universitat Ramon Llull: | https://discovery.url.edu/permalink/34CSUC_URL/1im36ta/alma991009624655806719 |
| Sumario: | Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements. |
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| Notas: | Description based upon print version of record. |
| Descripción Física: | 1 online resource (336 p.) |
| Público: | Specialized. |
| Bibliografía: | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| ISBN: | 9780191607240 9780191525957 9781435633506 9786611145347 9781281145345 |
| Acceso: | Open access |
