Reputation and judicial tactics a theory of national and international courts
"This book argues that national and international courts seek to enhance their reputations through the strategic exercise of judicial power. Courts often cannot enforce their judgments and must rely on reputational sanctions to ensure compliance. One way to do this is for courts to improve thei...
| Otros Autores: | |
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| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
New York :
Cambridge University Press
2014.
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| Colección: | CUP ebooks.
Comparative constitutional law and policy. |
| Acceso en línea: | Conectar con la versión electrónica |
| Ver en Universidad de Navarra: | https://innopac.unav.es/record=b39800702*spi |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover; Half-title; Series information; Title page; Copyright information; Dedication; Table of contents; Acknowledgments; 1 Introduction; A. Courts as long-term strategic actors that seek to maximize their reputations; 2 A theory of the reputation of courts; A. What is courts'' reputation?; B. Why courts want to increase their reputation; C. The reputation of parties facing the court; D. How courts improve their reputations; 1. Demanding judgments; 2. Discretionary reasoning; 3. Dissent; E. Reputation and public support; F. Methods for measuring judicial reputation.
- G. What this theory can and cannot explainH. Conclusion; 3 Constraints on courts; A. Legal-internal constraints; B. External constraints on national courts; 1. Noncompliance; 2. Criticism; 3. Curbing the court''s jurisdiction; 4. Changing the law; 5. Establishing new courts; 6. Influencing judicial selection and sanctions against judges; 7. Manipulating the court''s budget; C. External constraints on international courts; 1. Noncompliance; 2. Criticism; 3. Exiting the court''s jurisdiction; 4. Changing the treaty; 5. Establishing new courts.
- 6. Influencing judicial selection and sanctions against judges7. Manipulating the court''s budget; D. Comparing the constraints on national and international courts; E. The influence of third parties on judicial constraints; F. Conclusion and the tradeoff between external and internal constraints; 4 Tactics to increase courts'' reputation; A. Walking on the brink of noncompliance; B. Matching the remedy to the court''s reputation; C. Matching the reasoning to the court''s reputation; D. Matching the remedy to the reasoning; E. Incrementalism; F. Distinguishing remedy and precedent.
- G. Matching the demands to the partyH. Pleasing both parties; I. Spending reputation; J. Conclusion; 5 National court case study: Israeli Supreme Court; A. Background; B. The court''s strategy; 1. Shifting to discretionary reasoning as the court''s reputation increases; 2. Matching demanding judgments with constrained reasoning; 3. Incrementally progressing doctrine; 4. Matching demanding precedents with nondemanding remedies; C. The executive''s response; D. The court''s adaptation; E. Conclusion; 6 International court case study: European Court of Human Rights; A. Background.
- B. The court''s strategy1. Increasing the demands from the states; 2. Progressing incrementally; C. Facing the states'' strategy; 1. Demanding more from low-reputation states; D. Conclusion and the falsifiability of conflicting tendencies; 7 When compliance is irrelevant; A. Almost certain compliance; B. Almost certain noncompliance; C. No tangible compliance required; D. Other unique situations; E. Conclusion; 8 Conclusions; A. Summary; B. Normative implications; Bibliography; Books; Articles; Judgments; Israeli Supreme Court; European Court of Human Rights; U.S. Supreme Court.
