Regulation and development
Jean-Jacques Laffont provides the first theoretical analysis of the regulation of public services for developing countries.
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Combridge, UK ; New York :
Cambridge University Press
2005.
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| Colección: | CUP ebooks.
Federico Caffè lectures. |
| Acceso en línea: | Conectar con la versión electrónica |
| Ver en Universidad de Navarra: | https://innopac.unav.es/record=b39792511*spi |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover; Regulation and Development; Federico Caffè Lectures; Title; Copyright; Contents; Publisher's acknowledgment; Foreword; François Bourguignon; Y. Hossein Farzin; Preface; Introduction; 1 Overview of regulatory issues; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Structural issues; The structure of regulatory agencies; The structure of the industry; 1.3 Regulation of natural monopolies; The high cost of public funds; Monitoring; Hierarchical regulation and corruption; Commitment; Weakness of the rule of law; Financial constraints; Summing up; 1.4 Promoting competition by pricing access; Vertical disintegration.
- One-way access with vertical integrationTwo-way access for competition in infrastructures; 1.5 Competition policy; 1.6 Universal service; 1.7 Conclusion; 2 The rent extraction-efficiency trade-off; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 A simple model of regulation; Description; The full information benchmark; Optimal regulation without auditing of cost; Optimal regulation without transfers; Regulatory commission and capture; 2.3 Optimal regulation and the characteristics of developing countries; High cost of public funds; Regulation with transfers; Regulation without transfers.
- Incentives and stages of developmentHigher propensity to corruption; 2.4 The rent extraction-efficiency trade-off in practice; 2.5 Conclusion; Appendix; 3 A positive theory of privatization; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Literature review; Governments with private agendas; 3.3 The model; 3.4 Privatization; 3.5 Testing the theory; Empirical implications; The data; Determinants of the rate of privatization; Appendix 1; Appendix 2 Proof of proposition 3.3; 4 Enforcement, regulation, and development; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Optimal regulation; 4.3 Regulation and enforcement; 4.4 Predictions of the model.
- 4.5 ConclusionAppendix; 5 Access pricing rules for developing countries; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 About the optimality of the market structure; 5.3 Structural separation and pricing of access to an independently owned infrastructure; Competitive usage; Examples; Market power of users; Additional problems with Ramsey pricing; Regulatory capture; Risk of expropriation; 5.4 One-way access with vertical integration; Competitive users; Example; Example; Case b; A noncompetitive entrant; 5.5 Two-way access; 5.6 Conclusion; 6 Universal service obligationsin LDCs; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 The basic setting.
- 6.3 Optimal regulation under price discrimination6.4 Optimal regulation under uniform pricing; 6.5 Universal service policy under collusion; Collusion under discriminatory pricing; Collusion under uniform pricing; 6.6 Conclusion; Appendix; 7 Design of regulatory institutionsin developing countries; 7.1 Introduction; 7.2 Lessons from history in industrialized countries; The evolution of regulation until the Second World War; Nationalization as a response; The British post office and telegraph services; Railways in France; The United States' complex regulatory system; Two competition agencies.
