The nature and authority of precedent
Neil Duxbury examines how precedents constrain legal decision-makers and how legal decision-makers relax and avoid those constraints. There is no single principle or theory which explains the authority of precedent but rather a number of arguments which raise rebuttable presumptions in favour of pre...
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| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press
2008.
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| Colección: | CUP ebooks.
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| Acceso en línea: | Conectar con la versión electrónica |
| Ver en Universidad de Navarra: | https://innopac.unav.es/record=b39745508*spi |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- pt. I. Introduction: the usable past. Precedent ; Positivism and precedent ; A theory of precedent?
- pt. II. Why does English law have a doctrine of precedent?. The formation of a doctrine of precedent
- pt. III. Precedents as reasons. Looking for a certain ratio ; Shortcuts to reason ; Pre-emptive precedent? ; Conclusion
- pt. IV. Distinguishing, overruling and the problem of self-reference. Distinguishing ; Overruling ; The power to overrule oneself ; The authority of the practice statement
- pt. V. Why follow precedent?. Consequentialist justifications ; Deontological arguments ; Conclusion.
