Distress dynamics in bankruptcy

Distress dynamics in bankruptcy

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Hummelen, Jochem Meike, 1985- (-)
Formato: Libro electrónico
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Den Haag : Eleven International Publishing [2015], ©2016.
Colección:EBSCO Academic eBook Collection Complete.
Acceso en línea:Conectar con la versión electrónica
Ver en Universidad de Navarra:https://innopac.unav.es/record=b39277483*spi
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Cover
  • Title Page
  • Table of Contents
  • Glossary
  • 1 Introduction
  • 1 Introduction of the topic
  • 2 Central subject of this book and limiation of scope
  • 3 Overview of contents
  • 4 Methodology
  • 2 Efficient bankruptcy law in the U.S. and the Netherlands. Establishing an assessment framework
  • 1 Bankruptcy procedure in the US
  • 2 Bankruptcy procedure in the Netherlands
  • 1 Why does bankruptcy law exist?
  • 1.1 The common pool problem
  • 1.2 The balance-sheet insolvent debtor
  • 1.3 The cash-flow insolvent debtor
  • 1.4 Commons and anticommons.
  • 2 The (hypothetical) creditors' bargain
  • 3 The creditors' bargain theory and absolute priority
  • 4 The creditors' bargain theory and the new value exception
  • 1 Risk sharing as a goal of bankruptcy
  • 1.1 Diversification of common risks
  • 1.2 Minimizing perverse incentives on the eve of bankruptcy
  • 1.3 Protection of idiosyncratic value
  • 1.4 Protecting non-consensual claims
  • 2 Why risk sharing is not a goal of bankruptcy
  • 2.1 Limited class of beneficiaries
  • 2.2 Higher costs because of behavior by secured creditor
  • 2.3 Higher costs because of behavior by manager-shareholder.
  • 2.4 Contractual risk sharing as an alternative for mandated risk sharing
  • 3 Rehabilitation and the interests of non-property right holders as a goal of bankruptcy
  • 3.1 The justification for including non-economic values in the goals ofbankruptcy law: the rehabilitation view
  • 3.2 The justification for including non-economic values in the goals ofbankruptcy law: feminism and communitarianism
  • 3.3 The justification for including non-economic values in the goal ofbankruptcy law: the bankruptcy choice situation
  • 3.3.1 Bankruptcy as a response to financial distress.
  • 3.3.2 The bankruptcy choice model
  • 4 The case against introducing substantive policies in bankruptcy
  • 4.1 The social costs of internalization
  • 4.1.1 Re-distributional objectives increase the cost of credit
  • 4.1.2 The forum shopping problem
  • 4.1.3 Equity reasons
  • 4.2 Redistribution of wealth by other means than internalization
  • 4.3 The lack of a clear and consistent value view-framework
  • 5 Team production theory as an explanation for bankruptcy law
  • 5.1 The team production problem
  • 5.2 Team production theory.
  • 5.3 Team production theory: maximizing stakeholder value and themediating hierarch
  • 5.4 The team production theory in bankruptcy
  • 6 Why the team production theory is inadequate
  • 6.1 The primacy of shareholder value maximization
  • 6.2 Team production theory does not work in bankruptcy
  • 3 Shaping bankruptcy. What form shouldit take?
  • 1 Bankruptcy procedure in the U.S.
  • 2 Bankruptcy procedure in the Netherlands
  • 1 The administrative reorganization procedure
  • 1.1 The administrative reorganization procedures
  • 1.2 Costs of an administrative reorganization procedure.

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