Social choice and the mathematics of manipulation
Honesty in voting, it turns out, is not always the best policy. Indeed, in the early 1970s, Allan Gibbard and Mark Satterthwaite, building on the seminal work of Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, proved that with three or more alternatives there is no reasonable voting system that is non-manipulable; vo...
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| Autor Corporativo: | |
| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge ; New York :
Cambridge University Press
2005.
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| Colección: | EBSCO Academic eBook Collection Complete.
Outlooks. |
| Acceso en línea: | Conectar con la versión electrónica |
| Ver en Universidad de Navarra: | https://innopac.unav.es/record=b38385004*spi |
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