Hard target sanctions, inducements, and the case of North Korea
Because authoritarian regimes like North Korea can impose the costs of sanctions on their citizens, these regimes constitute "hard targets." Yet authoritarian regimes may also be immune-and even hostile-to economic inducements if such inducements imply reform and opening. This book capture...
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| Otros Autores: | |
| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Stanford, California :
Stanford University Press
2017.
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| Colección: | EBSCO Academic eBook Collection Complete.
Studies in Asian security. |
| Acceso en línea: | Conectar con la versión electrónica |
| Ver en Universidad de Navarra: | https://innopac.unav.es/record=b37673014*spi |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Introduction : the political economy of engagement
- The political economy of North Korea : the paradigmatic hard target
- North Korea's external economic relations
- The dilemmas of humanitarian assistance : the political economy of food
- The microeconomics of engagement
- Negotiating on nuclear weapons I : the rise and fall of the six party talks, 2002-2008
- Negotiating on nuclear weapons II : permanent crisis, 2009-2015
- Conclusion : whither North Korea? whither economic statecraft?
