The conflict over Kosovo why Milosevic decided to settle when he did
This report examines the reasons Slobodan Milosevic, then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, decided on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo. Drawing upon the testimony of Milosevic and other senior Serb and foreign officials who direc...
| Otros Autores: | |
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| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Santa Monica, CA :
Rand
2001.
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| Colección: | JSTOR Open Access monographs.
Online Rand research documents. |
| Acceso en línea: | Conectar con la versión electrónica |
| Ver en Universidad de Navarra: | https://innopac.unav.es/record=b37283911*spi |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Introduction
- He assumed accepting Rambouillet terms would endanger his rule
- He assumed he could force NATO to offer better terms
- He realized that his hoped-for leverage on NATO had evaporated
- Bombing produced a popular climate conducive to concessions
- Damage to "dual-use" infrastructure generated growing pressure
- Damage to military forces and KLA "resurgence" generated little pressure
- He expected unconstrained bombing if NATO's terms were rejected
- He probably also worried about threat of future invasion
- He believed NATO's terms provided him with some political cover
- Concluding observations.
