Delaying the employer mandate small change in the short term, big cost in the long run
In July 2013, the Obama administration announced a one-year delay in enforcement of the Affordable Care Act?⁰₉s (ACA) penalty on large employers that do not offer affordable health insurance coverage. To help policymakers understand the implications of this decision, RAND analysts employed the COMPA...
| Autores Corporativos: | , |
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| Otros Autores: | , |
| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Santa Monica, California :
RAND
2013.
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| Colección: | JSTOR Open Access monographs.
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| Acceso en línea: | Conectar con la versión electrónica |
| Ver en Universidad de Navarra: | https://innopac.unav.es/record=b3578071x*spi |
| Sumario: | In July 2013, the Obama administration announced a one-year delay in enforcement of the Affordable Care Act?⁰₉s (ACA) penalty on large employers that do not offer affordable health insurance coverage. To help policymakers understand the implications of this decision, RAND analysts employed the COMPARE microsimulation model to gauge the impact of the one-year delay of the so-called employer mandate. They found that the delay will not have a large impact on insurance coverage: Because relatively few firms and employees are affected, only 300,000 fewer people, or 0.2% of the population, will have access to insurance from their employer, and nearly all of these will get insurance from another source. However, a one-year delay in implementation of the mandate will result in |
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| Notas: | "RAND Corporation." |
| Descripción Física: | 1 recurso electrónico (4 p.) |
| Formato: | Forma de acceso: World Wide Web. |
| Bibliografía: | Incluye referencias bibliográficas. |
| ISBN: | 9780833083074 |
