Cambridge pragmatism from Peirce and James to Ramsey and Wittgenstein
Pragmatism, the home-grown philosophy of America, thinks of truth not as a static relation between a sentence and the believer-independent world, but rather, as a belief that is in some way successful. The founders of pragmatism, Peirce and James, developed this idea in more and less objective ways....
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| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
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Oxford :
Oxford University Press
2016.
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| Edición: | 1st ed |
| Colección: | Oxford scholarship online.
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Conectar con la versión electrónica |
| Ver en Universidad de Navarra: | https://innopac.unav.es/record=b34005286*spi |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover; Cambridge Pragmatism: From Peirce and James to Ramsey and Wittgenstein; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Preface; Acknowledgements; Reference and Spelling Policy; References to the works of William James; Reference to the works of C. S. Peirce; References to the works of Frank Ramsey; References to the works of Bertrand Russell; Reference to the works of Victoria Welby; References to the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein; Permissions; Introduction; PART I: Cambridge Massachusetts; 1: Peirce; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 The Pragmatic Maxim: Meaning, Use, Practice; 1.3 Belief and Disposition.
- 1.4 Truth1.5 Experience: Mathematics, Metaphysics, Religion, and Morals; 1.6 Logic and Probability; 1.7 Regulative Assumptions and the Principle of Bivalence; 2: James; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Psychology: Observation and Experience; 2.3 Truth and Usefulness; 2.4 Willing to Believe; 2.5 Religious Experience; 2.6 James on Common Sense; 3: Bridges across the Atlantic; 3.1 F. C. S. Schiller; 3.2 Victoria Welby; 3.3 C. K. Ogden; PART II: Cambridge England; 4: The Anti-Pragmatism of Pre-War Cambridge; 4.1 Introduction.
- 4.2 The Revolt against Idealism: The Early Moore and Russell on Propositions and Reality4.3 Russell's Logical Atomism; 4.4 Russell's Attack on Pragmatism; 4.5 Moore's Contribution; 4.6 The Wittgenstein of the Tractatus; 4.7 Wittgenstein's Intersections with the Vienna Circle; 5: The Pull of Pragmatism on Russell; 5.1 Russell at Harvard; 5.2 New Thoughts about Experience, Belief, and Meaning; 5.3 The Analysis of Mind; 6: Ramsey; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 The Undergraduate Ramsey and the Tractatus; 6.3 The Undergraduate Ramsey's Response to Russell.
- 6.4 The 1927 Ramsey: Belief, Action, Probability, Truth6.5 Philosophy and Meaninglessness; 6.6 'General Propositions and Causality'; 6.7 On Truth; 6.8 Ethics and Pragmatist Naturalism; 6.9 A Step beyond the Redundancy Theory to the Pragmatist Theory of Truth; 7: Wittgenstein: Post-Tractatus; 7.1 Introduction; 7.2 Wittgenstein and Ramsey, 1929; 7.3 Wittgenstein's 1929 Pragmatism; 7.4 The Primacy of Practice and Meaning as Use; 7.5 Truth; 7.6 Rule-Following, Privacy, and Behaviour; 7.7 Religion, Ethics, and Forms of Life; 7.8 On Doubt and Certainty; Conclusion; Bibliography; Names Index.
