Contract Theory in Continuous-Time Models
In recent years there has been a significant increase of interest in continuous-time Principal-Agent models, or contract theory, and their applications. Continuous-time models provide a powerful and elegant framework for solving stochastic optimization problems of finding the optimal contracts betwe...
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| Autor Corporativo: | |
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| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Berlin, Heidelberg :
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
2013.
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| Colección: | Springer Finance.
Springer eBooks. |
| Acceso en línea: | Conectar con la versión electrónica |
| Ver en Universidad de Navarra: | https://innopac.unav.es/record=b32925165*spi |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Preface
- PART I Introduction: 1.The Principal-Agent Problem
- 2.Single-Period Examples
- PART II First Best. Risk Sharing under Full Information: 3.Linear Models with Project Selection, and Preview of Results
- 4.The General Risk Sharing Problem
- PART III Second Best. Contracting Under Hidden Action- The Case of Moral Hazard: 5.The General Moral Hazard Problem
- 6.DeMarzo and Sannikov (2007), Biais et al (2007) – An Application to Capital Structure Problems: Optimal Financing of a Company
- PART IV Third Best. Contracting Under Hidden Action and Hidden Type – The Case of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: 7.Controlling the Drift
- 8.Controlling the Volatility-Drift Trade-Off with the First-Best
- PART IV Appendix: Backward SDEs and Forward-Backward SDEs
- 9.Introduction
- 10.Backward SDEs
- 11.Decoupled Forward Backward SDEs
- 12.Coupled Forward Backward SDEs
- References
- Index.
