Metaphilosophy and free will

In this text, the author looks at the contending schools of thought on the problem of free will. He argues that the free will problem is intractable because free will theorists are separated by metaphilosophical differences in the way they view the philosophical enterprise itself.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Double, Richard (-)
Formato: Libro electrónico
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: New York : Oxford University Press 1996.
Colección:EBSCO Academic eBook Collection Complete.
Acceso en línea:Conectar con la versión electrónica
Ver en Universidad de Navarra:https://innopac.unav.es/record=b31843384*spi
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • 1 Introduction; 1. Free Will Subjectivism and Metaphilosophy; 2. An Example of the Importance of Metaphilosophy; 3. A Provisional Definition of Free Choice; 4. Overview of the Book; I: THE FREE WILL PROBLEM AS A PROBLEM IN METAPHILOSOPHY; 2 Metaphilosophies; 3 Intermediate-Level Philosophical Principles; 4 How the Free Will Debate Depends on Metaphilosophy (I); 5 How the Free Will Debate Depends on Metaphilosophy (II); II: FREE WILL FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF PHILOSOPHY AS CONTINUOUS WITH SCIENCE; 6 How to Frame the Free Will Problem; 7 The Fragmentation of Free Will.