When insurers go bust an economic analysis of the role and design of prudential regulation

In the 1990s, large insurance companies failed in virtually every major market, prompting a fierce and ongoing debate about how to better protect policyholders. Drawing lessons from the failures of four insurance companies, When Insurers Go Bust dramatically advances this debate by arguing that the...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Plantin, Guillaume (-)
Otros Autores: Rochet, Jean-Charles
Formato: Libro electrónico
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press c2007.
Colección:EBSCO Academic eBook Collection Complete.
Acceso en línea:Conectar con la versión electrónica
Ver en Universidad de Navarra:https://innopac.unav.es/record=b31469061*spi
Descripción
Sumario:In the 1990s, large insurance companies failed in virtually every major market, prompting a fierce and ongoing debate about how to better protect policyholders. Drawing lessons from the failures of four insurance companies, When Insurers Go Bust dramatically advances this debate by arguing that the current approach to insurance regulation should be replaced with mechanisms that replicate the governance of non-financial firms. Rather than immediately addressing the minutiae of supervision, Guillaume Plantin and Jean-Charles Rochet first identify a fundamental economic rationale for supervising t.
Descripción Física:[viii], 101 p. : il
Formato:Forma de acceso: World Wide Web.
Bibliografía:Incluye referencias bibliográficas (p. [99]-101).
ISBN:9781400827770