Framing the global economic downturn crisis rhetoric and the politics of recessions
The global economic downturn that followed the collapse of major US financial institutions is no doubt the most significant crisis of our times. Its effects on corporate and governmental balance sheets have been devastating, as have been its impacts on the employment and well being of tens of millio...
| Otros Autores: | , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Canberra, ACT, Australia :
ANU E Press
[2009]
|
| Colección: | Australia and New Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG)
|
| Materias: | |
| Ver en Biblioteca Universitat Ramon Llull: | https://discovery.url.edu/permalink/34CSUC_URL/1im36ta/alma991009430905706719 |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- The contributors; Part I. Setting the stage; 1. From 'market correction' to 'global catastrophe': framing the economic downturn; 1. Economic rhetoric in times of turbulence; 2. A leadership perspective on economic crisis management; 3. Meaning making in economic crises: frames and counter-frames; 4. Overview and acknowledgments; References; 2. Understanding crisis exploitation: leadership, rhetoric and framing contests in response to the economic meltdown; 1. Crises as political battlegrounds; 2. Dissecting framing contests; The first framing contest: severity-ripple or crisis?
- The second framing contest: causality-incident or symptom?The third framing contest: the political game-blameworthy or not?; The fourth framing contest: the policy game-maintain or change policy commitments?; 3. Crisis rhetoric and framing contests in the media arena; 4. Studying framing contests during the economic meltdown: design and methods; References; Part II. One crisis, different worlds: the United States and Canada; 3. The United States: crisis leadership in times of transition; 1. Going down: the escalation of the sub-prime mortgage crisis; 2. Methodological considerations
- 3. Crisis development and elite rhetoric in the United StatesFrom crisis to opportunity: Presidents Bush and Obama; 14 March 2008: President Bush's 'business as usual'; 24 September 2008: Bush's acknowledgment of deep problems; 4 February 2009: President Obama blames Wall Street; 24 February 2009: Obama's address to Congress; From reassurance to repair: Treasury Secretaries Paulson and Geithner; 26 March 2008: Secretary Paulson's innuendo; 18 November 2008: Paulson's switch to crisis mode; 10 February 2009: Secretary Geithner's historical analogy
- 26 March 2009: Geithner's testimony to the House of RepresentativesBack to the Depression? Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke; 14 March 2008: Bernanke's response to Bear Stearns' collapse; 1 December 2008: Bernanke's acknowledgment of crisis; 18 February 2009: Bernanke after the presidential transition; 10 March 2009: Bernanke acknowledges internal factors; 4. Conclusions: the limits of crisis management by speech; References; 4. Canada: the politics of optimism; 1. Warranted optimism or an illusion of invulnerability?; 2. Methodological considerations
- 3. Crisis development and elite rhetoric in Canada12 May 2008: the Finance Minister's assertion of Canadian resilience; 25 September 2008: bank governor Carney's crisis narrative; 7 October 2008: Prime Minister Harper's bid for re-election; 17 October 2008: a re-elected Harper opens the new Parliament; 27 January 2009: Finance Minister Flaherty's budget speech; 10 February 2009: bank governor Carney's 'realism'; 23 February 2009: Flaherty attempts to rally the public; 10 March 2009: Harper's continued optimism; 1 April 2009: the bank governor sees light at the end of the tunnel
- 4. Framing the financial crisis in Canada: analysis and conclusions
